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Introduction 
Competing in the Global Arena: 
Sport and Foreign Relations since 1945 
Andrew L. johns 
Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, 
jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in wit-
nessing violence: in other words it is war minus the shooting. 
-George Orwell, "The Sporting Spirit" 
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true politi-
cal instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with 
other means. 
-Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
In late February 2013, former NBA star Dennis Rodman visited the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in what several media 
outlets characterized as a "basketball diplomacy" mission aimed at en-
couraging "openness and better relations with the outside world." Rod-
man, whose antics both on and off the court overshadowed his prodigious 
skill as one of the best rebounders and defenders in NBA history, seems 
like an odd choice to be a diplomatic emissary-an unofficial one, to be 
sure-of the United States to North Korea. His unique public persona 
aside, his visit occurred only weeks after the Pyongyang regime conducted 
its latest and most powerful nuclear test, which was strongly criticized by 
the United States, its allies, and other world powers for defying the United 
--
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The Cold War Games of a 
Colonial Latin American Nation 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1966 
Antonio Sotomayor 
As an "unincorporated territory" of the United States yet as part of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Puerto Rico presents multiple problems for 
academic study in areas that include nationalism, colonial/postcolonial 
studies, democracy/imperialism, and, of course, the politics of Olymp-
ism. Puerto Rico's balancing act of belonging to, but not being part of, 
both the United States and Latin America permeates the often conflictive 
politics of the region. Yet Puerto Rico, like the Caribbean in general-ex-
cept Cuba-has been kept at the fringes of world political attention and 
hence also from significant academic study. This chapter will demonstrate 
t~e pivotal role Puerto Ricans played during a crucial time in Cold War 
htstory, during the 1966 edition of the oldest regional games sponsored 
by the International Olympic Committee (IOC)-the Central American 
and Caribbean Games. 
In this way, for Puerto Ricans these games were vital not only to their e:~rts of political modernization but also to their hopes of keeping alive 
~ etr Olympic persona and to their agency in dealing with Caribbean 
old War diplomacy. Moreover, the source of the conflicts in hosting 
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218 Antonio Sotomayor 
the games, and the negotiations to solve them, show that although such 
international competition is seen as apolitical, they were a very political 
affair. The sport leaders involved in the matter-whether from Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, the United States, or the IOC-all took positions and acted 
within the urgency of Cold War politics. 
As part of the Caribbean, Puerto Rico evidences some of the issues 
the "global South" faces in international sport. Puerto Rican Olympism 
arose from the colonial and postcolonial structures imposed by the North 
Atlantic powers, as seen in the anti-apartheid campaign and the solidar-
ity movement between Africa and the English Caribbean presented by 
Aviston Downes in chapter 4. Nonetheless, just as sport was used by Juan 
Peron to showcase a "New Argentina," as Cesar Torres discussed in chap-
ter 5, the Tenth Central American and Caribbean Games (X CACG) of 
1966 in San Juan, Puerto Rico, became for Puerto Ricans the event to 
showcase the vitality of their new political system. 
Contrary to the anti-imperialist critique of the United States by Peron, 
for Puerto Ricans the idea was to showcase the commonwealth under the 
sponsorship of Washington. Furthermore, hosting these games was also 
the best indicator that Puerto Ricans were a legitimate nation-member of 
an international sporting community. Indeed, Puerto Rico in 1966 was 
a stable and a vital member of Central American and Caribbean Olymp-
ism, having participated in all editions of the Central American and Ca-
ribbean Games since the second in 1930. The Puerto Rican participation 
in Caribbean Olympism left no doubt that this was a nation with a solid 
regional athletic tradition, having participated and consistently finished 
in the top four of the medal count since 1930.1 Now, by being hosts of 
the games, Puerto Ricans opened their doors to their regional neighbors 
in order to show their national vitality, athletic strength, and culrurz.! 
uniqueness. 
After the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952 and 
continuing participation in the Pan-American Games (PAG) and Sum-
mer Olympic Games-Puerto Ricans had been participating in the pAG 
since 1955 and the Olympics since 1948-there was no doubt that Puerto 
Rico was a nation, at least culturally. 2 Granted, as John MacAloon stateS 
in his study of the colonial politics present in the 1979 PAG in San Juan, 
this nationhood was only internationally visible and applicable in sport, 
but it was a nation nonetheless. 1 In this regard, Felix Huertas Gonzalez 
l11c Cold War Games of a Colonial Latin American Nation 219 
is correct in affirming that although Puerto Rico is not an independent 
nation-state, it has, as a result of the growing popularity and precedence 
given to Olympic competition worldwide, a presence that for many equals 
the status of nationhood." While this nonsovereign nationhood might 
seem contradictory to some, it also occurs in the French and English 
Caribbean.'i 
However, the X CACG became not only a showcase of Puerto Rico's 
nationhood but also, unwillingly, of its inherent colonial status. Faced 
with internationally active, communist Cuba and the uncertainty of its 
I participation at the games, the process by which the Cubans were exclud-
ed and included shows that the games were as much a window through 
which to see colonial and regional politics and can be called colonial 
Olympism. Colonial Olympism, in this regard, could constitute a new 
way of seeing the particular ways in which the Olympic movement de-
veloped in areas of the world that were, and/or are, affected by colonial/ 
imperial structures. 1he tension of transporting the Cuban delegation to 
Puerto Rican territory and the subsequent moments of hostility chan-
neled Cold War conflicts. Joaquin Martinez-Rousset has documented the 
connection of politics to Puerto Rican Olympism, showing how Puerto 
Rico's first National Olympic Committee (NOC) in 1933 was a branch 
of the government.(' In the case of the 1966 X CACG, the dilemma of 
banning or inviting the Cubans reflected Cold War principles, forcing an-
other conflictive situation of East versus West and bringing once again an 
air of hostility to the Caribbean. Tension from the Cuban Missile Crisis 
in 1962 still lingered in the minds, policies, and actions of the different 
parries involved. 7 
The conflicts surrounding these games were not limited to the bu-
reaucracy of the government. 1here were many "incidents" on the ground 
involving athletes, spectators, the citizenry, and political groups. The pres-
sure to defect constituted a premier tool against the Cuban delegation 
and by extension against the Cuban government. In the end these games 
demonstrated as well that while all parties involved tried to keep Olymp-
ism and politics separate, it ultimately proved an impossible task. The 
defense of Olympism became a political game, in which Puerto Ricans, 
Americans, Cubans, the IOC, and the Soviet bloc were directly involved. 
The island of Puerto Rico, highly regarded for its strategic position in 
the Atlantic, has been called the "world's oldest colony" for a reason.H Af-
220 Anronio Sotomayor 
ter four centuries of Spanish colonialism, in 1898 Puerto Rico was ceded 
as "war booty" to the United States as a result of the Spanish-American 
War. Puerto Ricans were made US citizens in 1917 just prior to the Amer-
ican entry into World War I, yet this citizenship lacked full parity with 
mainland US citizens. Puerto Ricans could not vote for president, send a 
full delegation to Congress to represent their interests, or be fully protect-
ed by the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution. As defined in the Insular 
Cases heard by the US Supreme Court in the early 1900s, Puerto Rico of-
ficially "belongs to, but is not part of, the United States."9 For this reason, 
it has been argued that US citizenship was granted to Puerto Ricans not 
only to recruit soldiers for World War I but to secure a hegemonic hold. 10 
This hegemonic relationship has been studied in regard to sport and recre-
ation. Roberta Park has shown how sport and recreation culture, policies, 
and infrastructure were part of a militaristic and Americanization agenda 
used by Washington to secure a "benevolent" presence on the island. 11 
Even though Puerto Rico was excluded from being part of the United 
States, it was also prohibited from engaging in international trade or im-
plement local tariffs. 12 Indeed, being "unincorporated" meant that Con-
gress officially closed the door for eventual US statehood. Despite the 
opposition of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party-including a revolt for 
independence on October 30, 1950-the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
was established in 1952.13 The creation of the commonwealth, as Law 600 
passed by Congress, followed a post-World War II decolonization trend. 
Yet this legal change in status mainly allowed Puerto Ricans to admin-
ister their own territory, leaving the legal parameters mentioned above 
unchanged. 14 Thus after 1952, Puerto Rico became a sort of mirage of 
an autonomous political entity. Despite this lack of political sovereignty 
and democratic arrangement, during the early Cold War years Puerto 
Rico was regarded as a showcase of democracy and capitalism,11 mainly in 
comparison to the unstable republics of Latin America and the Caribbean 
that were plagued by dictatorships or authoritarian regimes. 16 
Negotiating Sport and Politics 
The X CACG of 1966 in San Juan is noteworthy because a national dele-
gation was denied invitation for political reasons. This occurred when the 
Puerto Rican authorities denied visas to the Cuban delegation, alleging 
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that its presence alongside approximately twenty thousand very vocal Cu-
ban exiles in Puerto Rico constituted a threat to the stability and security 
of the island. Nonetheless, such denial of visas was not the first time com-
munist Cuba was denied visas to an athletic event in the area. There had 
been a movement to deny visas to the Cuban delegation for the IX CACG 
of 1962 in Kingston, Jamaica. 17 Moreover, Cuban athletes were denied 
visas to the IOC-sponsored XVI World Cup of Baseball in Colombia in 
1965.18 They were also denied visas by the Guatemalan government for 
the soccer finals of the IOC-sponsored Confederation of North, Central 
American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) in 1965, 
and as a result of this they were denied visas for the regional soccer com-
petitions in Curac;ao. Nonetheless, the Puerto Rican case was particularly 
unique in that this was a US "territory" that had received many Cuban 
exiles and denied visas to communist Cuba, in turn a declared ally of the 
Soviet Union. 
The development of Puerto Rican sport and Olympism had been pri-
marily a result of the efforts of Julio Enrique Monagas. An athlete as a 
young student in the southern town of Ponce in the 1910s, Monagas by 
the early 1940s had become a close ally of the Popular Democratic Party 
(Partido Popular Democratico, or PPD), which headed the establishment 
of the commonwealth in 1952. He served as commissioner of the gov-
ernment-created sport institutions since 1941 and headed the Olympic 
Committee of Puerto Rico (COPR) since its creation in 1948. Thanks 
to his charismatic, populist, and dynamic sport leadership both locally 
and internationally, he quickly became a recognized leader in hemispheric 
Olympism from the 1940s through the early 1960s. For his involvement 
in the Olympic movement, Monagas was awarded the Olympic Order 
(silver) by the IOC on April 5, 1984. At that time Monagas was only the 
second person in the Americas to receive the award, the first one being 
Peter Ueberroth (gold) from the United States. 
Monagas was elected president of the newly established Central 
American and Caribbean Sport Organization (CACSO) in a meeting held 
in Mexico City, February 8-10, 1960. This organization, whose creation 
dates back to May 13, 1959, in a meeting of NOC leaders in Kingston, 
Was pan of a larger plan of the IOC to organize Olympism in the Ameri-
cas. It was considered by IOC member Jose de Jesus Clark Flores, from 
Mexico, to be the first step toward better world Olympic organization. 19 
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Therefore, for Monagas the X CACG in his home country could have 
been the final test that would place him as a hero among Olympic leaders. 
The decision to host the X CACG in San Juan was a result of much 
internal government discussion but also at the international level. Mona-
gas, as president of CACSO, was able to make use of a petition by other 
NOCs that had declared Puerto Rico to be the ideal place to host the X 
CACG on account of its successful athletic history but also as a result of 
its strategic geographical location and tourist attractions. 20 1hese same 
regional sport leaders had expressed wanting to come to the island even if 
it meant running competitions in the streets or swimming events in the 
ocean. 21 For Puerto Ricans, the crux of the matter was that it was impera-
tive to host the games in order to prove to the countries of the area, and 
the IOC, that Puerto Rico's political modernization as a commonwealth 
had been successful. It was, indeed, a matter of political legitimation. By 
hosting these games, Puerto Ricans could now say that they had "pro-
gressed" enough to be an Olympic host to other nations. 1heir new politi-
cal status, as an estado fibre asociado-literally in English "free associated 
state," yet the official version is "commonwealth"-of the United States, 
provided the political stature to claim true sporting autonomy and ath-
letic diplomacy. 
It is important to recognize that all groups involved in the politics 
within these games claimed to be protecting the Olympic ideal from po-
litical intervention. Yet, by doing this, all involved actually took very po-
litical stances that mirrored Cold War and regional political conflicts. In 
early 1964, Monagas asked Roberto Sanchez Vilella whether Puerto Rican 
authorities planned to ask the US Department of State to issue visas for 
the Cuban delegation. 22 Sanchez Vilella, who this same year was elected 
the second governor of the commonwealth, after Luis Munoz Marin's un-
matched sixteen-year incumbency, wrote to Munoz Marin regarding rhe 
Cubans' visas. In his letter Sanchez Vilella aligned himself with an impor-
tant segment of the island's population, led by Cuban refugees who wished 
Cuba to be banned from the games. 21 He wrote: "This Government decid-
edly opposes that a Cuban team come to Puerto Rico to participate in said 
games as long as the present Cuban regime governs that island. We do not 
think that their presence can be of any service but, to the contrary, it will 
create a difficult and intolerable situation in the country."2" 
His main reason for this ban was that there were in the island some 
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"18,000 Cuban refugees" who had escaped the "totalitarian and Com-
munist regime" of Fidel Castro. Because of this, he thought it would be 
almost impossible to prevent "clashes" between the exiles and Castro's 
athletes due to "the demonstrated aggressive attitude in Jamaica as well 
as in Brazil and other places of the hemisphere where they have panici-
pated."25 Yet, while these reasons were in relation to an internal conflict 
between two groups of Cubans in Puerto Rico, Sanchez Vilella also men-
tioned direct affronts by the Cuban government toward Puerto Rico. He 
cited the expressions of Ramon Calcinas of Cuba's United Party of the 
Socialist Revolution of Cuba (Partido Unido de Ia Revolici6n Socialista 
de Cuba, or PURSC): "Puerto Rico will be free by the fight of their people 
and the solidarity of all countries of this continent and of the world .... 
Puerto Rico will be free like South Vietnam will be, who is fighting 
against North American imperialism, just like Angola and Venezuela."26 
Their conclusions were based on the report of a commission that stud-
ied the case and stated that Castro's government since 1959 had "devel-
oped, sponsored, and directed" an interventionist policy throughout the 
continent to establish "Communist regimes." Although making no direct 
reference to the missile crisis just two years before, the commonwealth 
government viewed the expressions by Calcinas as "acts of political ag-
gression," as were other acts such as calling the Puerto Rican governor a 
"satrap" and "traitor"27 and expressing his support for a "war of national 
liberation" in Puerto Rico. 
The sentiment by the Puerto Rican government has to be viewed in 
light of its strong alliance and territorial status in relation to the United 
States, hence its inherent ideological influence to the Right and capital-
ism. In 1948 the local legislature adopted a McCarthyist-inspired law, 
commonly known as the Gag Law (Law No. 53, 1948-1957). 28 Modeled 
after the Smith Act, the Gag Law made illegal the open discussion and 
display of symbols related to Puerto Rican independence. The nationalists 
who remained active after the repression of the 1950s were often labeled 
communists, regardless of their ideological orientation, and were further 
persecuted by both local and federal authorities. 29 In 1987 the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation confirmed having kept files (known as carpetas) 
for thirty years on thousands of individuals for supposedly engaging in 
proindependence activities, evidencing in turn systematic harassment and 
surveillance of its own citizenry. 
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These accusations by Calcinas were most despised by the common-
wealth leaders who were trying to present their new political status as a 
political formula of decolonization. Having a Cuban delegation in Pueno 
Rico attacking their autonomy went against the very athletic diplomatic 
mission of presenting a decolonized Puerto Rican Olympic delegation. 
Simply said, Puerto Rico's presence as a sporting nation represented the 
commonwealth's autonomy to the world. Having this autonomy mocked 
and attacked by communist Cubans was considered by the common-
wealth government to be a political affront. 
However, the intention of using sport to show a sovereign Puerto Rico 
under the auspices of the United States went beyond Cuba and was im-
mersed in a world divided by East and West. The communist powers had 
made their position clear regarding Puerto Rico. At the 1960 United Na-
tions assembly, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had exhorted the body 
to place Puerto Rico in the list of colonies still to be freed. 5° Plus, accord-
ing to Victor Riesel, a small contingent of Puerto Rican communists had 
traveled to Beijing, where it was received by a cheering crowd while the ra-
dio called for Puerto Rican "freedom from American lmperialism."'1 He 
continued, saying that there were Chinese communist agents recruiting 
in Puerto Rico, pointing as well to a Puerto Rican clandestine communist 
force of four to five hundred in the mountains of El Yunke, trained in 
Cuba and ready to start a communist revolution. 
With all of this in mind, Sanchez Vilella thought it was better not 
to have any sort of relation with the Cubans, "not even in the field of 
sports." 12 He did acknowledge that the United States had revised its policy 
and now accepted the Soviet Union and other communist countries in 
Olympic Games, but the Puerto Rican case was different. According to 
him the Soviet Union had abandoned its support of other "wars of nation-
al liberation" and instead assumed a policy of political coexistence, some-
thing very different from the Cuban case. As a result, the commonwealth 
government's decision was "definite," as it vowed to "actively combat anY 
measure before the United States government intended to allow the entrY 
of the Cuban delegation to Puerto Rico."15 Regardless that Washington 
maintained sovereignty over borders, customs, and immigration in Puerto 
Rico, commonwealth leaders were willing to defend their alleged sover-
eignty against US authority. Given the consistent support and consent 
to US rule in Puerto Rico, this expression by the secretary of state was 
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particularly extraordinary. The Cubans had touched a very sensitive po-
litical nerve by accusing Puerto Ricans of being colonials. It was even 
more threatening because it came from a communist, former Caribbean 
"brotherly" country and because the games were in Puerto Rico. More 
than an attack on all the work of gaining international credibility by the 
COPR, it was an attack on the very nature of the "compact of association" 
with the United States. 
When the news got out in early 1965 that the commonwealth govern-
ment, now led by Roberto Sanchez Vilella, would oppose the granting 
of visas to the Cubans, it became the talk of the country, being covered 
as well in the press in New York and later in Chicago and Los Ange-
les.·l4 Joaquin Martinez Rousset in his newspaper column "Desde el Dug-
out" pointed to the Olympic-political dilemma by indicating that Avery 
Brundage, as president of the IOC, could take away Puerto Rico's seat due 
to the interference of politics in Olympic competition. In his observation, 
Martinez Rousset was right: according to Olympic rules there cannot be 
political interference in Olympic tournaments, an issue well known by 
the COPR since the internal conflicts of the 1950s.10 
By early 1965 Monagas had written to Brundage, communicating to 
him the commonwealth's position with regard to Cuba and the volatile 
situation of the Cuban exiles on the island. To this Martinez Rousset 
wondered, "What will happen if Cuba sends some two hundred athletes 
to the X Games and here they confront some 20,000 countrymen exiled 
and willing to send them to the firing squad?"1r' While Martinez Rousset 
acknowledged Brundage's earlier resolution of taking away the site of the 
World Championship of Basketball from Manila for the Philippine gov-
ernment's rejection of visas for some communist countries, he argued that 
in Manila there were not twenty thousand exiles from those countries. 
The X CACG in San Juan was a "government against government prob-
lem" from an "anticommunist" government against one "painted red."17 
He finished, affirming that "it is possible that this is the most explosive 
situation that the IOC has ever been stumbled within all of its history."'8 
Again, while there is no direct reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis 
in Martinez Rousset's article, there was an interesting use of Cold War 
Warfare language: "firing squad," "explosive," "anticommunist," "painted 
red:" It was, as a matter of fact, a highly problematic issue with the IOC, 
Which attempted to uphold a strong stance against political intervention 
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during Brundage's presidency.39 Yet the Puerto Rican case was special, and 
this is precisely what Monagas told Brundage in a private cable. Although 
internally the commonwealth's government, if needed, was willing to go 
against the United States, Monagas publicly presented it as if Puerto Rico 
was just following US mandates when he stated that since Washington 
had no diplomatic relations with Cuba, the commonwealth would not in-
tervene. Plus, Monagas continued to say, the presence of twenty thousand 
Cuban exiles "can be the cause of a tragedy in an activity that is supposed 
to foster goodwill amongst the different countries of the world."40 The new 
Puerto Rican secretary of state, Dr. Carlos Lastra, indicated to the press 
that his government maintained its decision not to ask for the visas for the 
Cubans and that its decision was "in harmony" with the US Department 
of State.41 As we will see later, this latter statement was not necessarily 
true. Moreover, the Puerto Rican authorities used their colonial relation-
ship to appear innocent in relation to the Cubans' visas, thereby making 
the United States the ultimate culprit. 
After Monagas called Brundage to inquire of the IOC's position, 
Brundage acknowledged the complexity of the problem and stated that 
he would need to further study the circumstances.42 The situation was 
definitely complicated, because if Puerto Rico lost the privilege to host 
the games as a result of political interference, the alternative site options 
were equally problematic. One was Guatemala, yet it admitted not having 
the funds or infrastructure to host the games, while also declaring that it 
would deny visas to the Cubans. The other options were Colombia and El 
Salvador, which had also broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. 
Brundage stood his ground and told the international press that the 
IOC "strongly opposed political interference in sport" and that if Puerto 
Rico failed to invite all nation-members of the Olympic movement in 
the area, it risked losing the opportunity in the future to host Olympic 
Games. For Monagas, the COPR was innocent of involving politics and 
sport, maintaining that the COPR had not been intervening with com-
monwealth authorities regarding the visas.4' According to him, the deci-
sion to deny the visas was "entirely governmental" and was not related to 
the COPR whatsoever. 
News of the problem of the Cuban visas and the X CACG began to 
spread throughout the Olympic world. The Central American and t~e 
Caribbean nations were expectedly attentive to the situation, and even 1n 
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Colombia there were rumors that Puerto Rico had relinquished hosting 
the games.44 Coverage of the conflict reached Santa Barbara, California, 
Brundage's winter residence, where a newspaper reported on February 24, 
1965, that the IOC president opposed the decision to ban Cubans from 
the games but indicated that the matter was in the hands of CACS0.45 
Nonetheless, Brundage also stated that the topic would be brought up 
in the next IOC meeting in Madrid. To some extent, it can be said that 
Brundage was hoping that CACSO would follow the IOC's nonpoliti-
cal interference and argue for the visas to be issued. The problem had 
definitely reached European Olympic circles when Juan Cepero from El 
Mundo, the principal newspaper in the island, reported on February 25 
that Monagas had called D. T. Pain, the secretary-treasurer of the Inter-
national Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF), in London to explain the 
situation. Pain promised to study the case and help to resolve the issue.46 
An Olympic Resolution of Cold War Hostility 
In the meantime, the leaders of CACSO meeting in Caracas, Venezu-
ela, produced an unprecedented decision called the Caracas Resolution. 
Brundage's hopes to see CACSO oppose political intervention in Olymp-
ism vanished when CACSO, presided over by Monagas, officially passed 
this resolution banning the Cuban delegation from the X CACG in San 
JuanY Citing "security concerns," CACSO also indicated that its resolu-
tion upheld the IOC's nondiscrimination statute based on race, religion, 
or politics. Moreover, the alternative host countries-Colombia, Guate-
mala, and El Salvador-indicated that physically they could not host the 
games and that they could not guarantee that their governments would 
grant the Cubans visas on account of international agreements signed in 
their membership of the Organization of American States.48 
The Caracas Resolution was signed by Monagas as president of CAC-
SO (Puerto Rico); Dr. Anibal Illueca Sibauste, vice president (Panama); 
Jose Beracasa, treasurer (Venezuela); Manuel de J. Rivas Rodriguez (El 
Salvador); Victor Luque Salanueva (Mexico); and George Abrahams (Ja-
lllaica). Also present at the meeting were Gen. Jose de J. Clark Flores (~exico), honorary president of CACSO and member of the IOC's Exec-
~tve Board, and Dr. Julio Bustamante (Mexico), IOC member. Though 
t e meeting resulted in the signing of the resolution, it was not without 
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conflict. As it happened, it was a political showdown that demonstrat-
ed Monagas's weight in international sport and the politics of athletic 
diplomacy. 
An anonymous letter sent to Brundage marked "CONFIDENTIAL" 
confirms the domestic political bias of Monagas in the matter of the Cu-
bans' visas in an effort to "strengthening his political position with the 
new Commonwealth in power in Puerto Rico."49 The author, who re-
mains unidentified, concluded that the executive committee of CACSO 
(with the exception of Luque Salanueva) came ready to exclude Cuba from 
the games, a meeting that he rather called "the hold-up of Caracas." "TI1e 
sporting political pieces were well played, because regardless of the invita-
tion of the Latin American members of the IOC, only Bustamante and 
Clark showed up, having no voting leverage in the final decision. As the 
resolution was discussed, members of the executive committee (Monagas, 
Illueca Sibauste, and Julio Illescas Rojas from Guatamala) complained 
that the IOC was too old and archaic to reach a decision on the Cuban 
case before the games began. 
Things then got more personal, and verbal affronts even targeted 
Brundage. As a result of the escalating instability, the anonymous author 
suggested that Monagas "abandon this stupid farce" as it would get him 
and the Puerto Rican delegation into trouble and could even result in the 
withdrawal ofiOC recognition to the X CACG and a ban on hosting the 
Olympic Games. As a matter of fact, he suggested that since there was 
so much discontent toward the IOC and Brundage, why not disassociate 
completely from the Olympic movement and carry out the games without 
IOC recognition? Such a suggestion resulted in more discussion and loud 
words. In the end, the resolution passed, and the meeting was adjourned. 
Suffice it to say, the Caracas Resolution was a political struggle not 
only involving Cold War ideologies but also the position of Puerto Rico as 
a leading "country" in regional politics. Monagas, by setting the tone and 
content of the resolution to ban communist Cuba from the games, made 
the commonwealth's policy in regard to communism and set the parame-
ters of how the games, and the region's politics for that matter, would play 
out. It also left clear that CACSO under Monagas's leadership was willing 
to go against the "old and archaic" IOC in a position relatively similar to 
Sanchez Vi lelia's willingness to go against the Department of State. 
The news of the CACSO resolution reached Brundage shortly after 
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it was made public in March 1965. As indicated in the confidential letter 
above, General Clark was strongly opposed to the Caracas Resolution 
and as a result asked Brundage and the IOC to cancel his earlier peti-
tion for IOC sponsorship of the games.50 After a meeting of the IOC's 
executive board on April 12, 1965, in Lausanne, Brundage agreed with 
General Clark and communicated to CACSO that it needed to apply for 
roc recognition of the games. This recognition was contingent upon the 
organizing committee inviting all regional members of the IOC to the 
X CACG, including Cuba, citing that the IOC had "an inflexible policy 
against political interference in sport, for any reason whatsoever." The 
meeting in Lausanne included all international amateur sport federations, 
which approved this policy "unanimously." Finally Brundage, regretting 
the situation in Puerto Rico, thought that Puerto Ricans had no excuse 
because the same situation regarding Cuba's participation at the CACG 
occurred in Jamaica in 1962.51 
However, although the situation in Jamaica had presented the same 
groups involved in the conflict-that is Puerto Ricans, Cuban athletes, 
and some Cuban exiles-the situation was hardly the same.52 First, re-
gardless of whether the presence of the twenty thousand exiles in Puerto 
Rico was used as the rationale to ban the Cuban delegation from the 
games, the Cuban presence was a real threat and with the incidents in 
Kingston so recent, security was a practical concern for the organizing 
committee. Although it is true that thousands of anti-Castro Cubans had 
immigrated to Jamaica since the end of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, 
their situation was considered temporary, as Jamaica was seen as a spring-
board for eventual refugee status in the United States. For example, by 
January 1962 some 10,000 Cuban exiles had gone to Jamaica, yet 9,670 
had received US visas.53 Second, although being also heavily influenced 
by US Caribbean policy, Jamaica was nonetheless an independent and 
sovereign nation, with control over its ports, customs, and visas.54 Puerto 
Rico was totally dependent on the United States regarding who could 
enter the island. Third, Puerto Rico, as an unincorporated territory of the ~nited States, had to follow US policy on foreign relations, and at that 
ttme Washington had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. Indeed, the 
United States had just come out of a real war scenario involving Soviet 
nuclear missiles in Cuba. Thus a potentially violent incident involving 
revolutionary Cuban athletes in a US territory with American citizens 
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and thousands of ardent Cuban exiles was a recipe for disaster and could 
renew the real threat of war. 
General Clark, although being isolated from the Caracas meeting, 
still intended to work toward including Cuba in the X CACG. He mer 
with Monagas in late July 1965 and talked over the phone with German 
Rieckehoff Sampayo of the organizing committee to help resolve the situ-
ation. His greatest wish was that CACSO would "find its way" and not 
lose its "permanent recognition" within the IOC.''i Rieckehoff Sampayo, 
who became another preeminent figure of Puerto Rican Olympism, be-
came a sport leader through his work with the early stages of the local 
top-level basketball league, presiding over it from 1942 to 1944. From 
1947 to 1949 Rieckehoff Sampayo worked at the College of Agriculture 
and Mechanical Arts (Colegio de Agricultura y Arras Mednicas) in Ma-
yagi.iez in the development of sport facilities, while in 1963 he founded 
the Equestrian Federation of Puerto Rico, which marked as well his full 
and official introduction into the COPR. Later in 1977, Rieckehoff Sam-
payo became Puerto Rico's first IOC member, and in 1980 the IOC deco-
rated him with the Olympic Order medal. 
At stake was not only the X CACG but also the very existence of 
CACSO and Central American and Caribbean Olympism. It seems that 
after the ultimatum by the IOC and President Brundage, CACSO (led 
by Monagas), COPR (now under the brief presidency of Francisco Bueso), 
and the organizing committee led by Emilio Huyke reevaluated their po-
sition and now were open to the invitation of all roc members of the 
area to the games, including CubaY' With this change in position, it was 
a matter of dealing with Puerto Rican and US authorities to issue the Cu-
bans visas. This proved to be difficult, since the Puerto Rican government 
was still upholding its position of banning Cuba from the games. At least 
this is what can be inferred by Dr. Lastra's comments in the newspapers 
when he said, "We will neither help them [the organizing committee] get 
the visas for the Cuban players nor will we oppose the granting of such 
visas."'i7 With broken diplomatic relations between the United Stares and 
Cuba, this might have meant that the commonwealth government was 
relying on a refusal of the United States to grant the visas. 
What happened next is very important to understanding the politiCS 
of the CACG, how it began to resolve this problem, and the implications 
for international politics, including Puerto Rican colonialism. It was an 
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outside element, once again, that interceded in Puerto Rican Olympism 
because Brundage, in conversation with C. Allan Steward, director of 
the Office of Caribbean Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 
managed to get the Department of State to issue visas to the Cuban del-
egation. In fact, on December 5, 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent 
a cable to Felicia Torregrosa, technical director for the organizing com-
mittee, indicating that the Cubans' visas would be processed.'~ In this 
sense, Brundage as president of the IOC, committed the exact same error 
he had been decrying throughout his presidency: political interference. 
By assuring the Cuban visas from the State Department, he had actually 
interfered in a political matter to safeguard the participation of the Cuban 
delegation at the X CACG. Moreover, he and Steward had overridden 
and totally disregarded the policy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
of not issuing visas, an act that exposed their inherent colonial status. It 
became evident that Puerto Rico, although claiming sporting and even 
political autonomy, had to some extent failed to have fully achieved either 
of the two. It is exactly this colonial dynamic that separated the Puerto 
Rican situation from the Jamaican one and is what made, and still makes, 
Puerto Rico unique within Latin American politics and international 
sports. 
With this move, the IOC was again unmasked as a political actor in 
the CACG and in Olympism in general. This politico-Olympic relation 
was certainly known back then as well. It was actually acknowledged by 
Steward when he stated that "it would be very bad policy for the Gov-
ernment to refuse visas simply because they are Cubans, because then 
it would prevent any U.S. city from being considered for the Olympic 
Games.'''i~ TI1at is, Steward knew the importance of athletic diplomacy 
in international competition, and he was not willing to risk it because 
of stubborn colonial subjects. Moreover, he understood the significance 
of having recognition and support of the IOC if, and when, the United 
States wanted to host Olympic Games in the future. Even though the 
United States was immersed in the Cold War, it was more important to 
play by the rules of the IOC if it wanted to win the war on the athletic 
field. 
It was only after Brundage himself guaranteed the visas that he fi-
nally gave IOC's patronage to the X CACG in San JuanY1 Nonetheless, 
to safeguard the legitimacy of CACSO, as General Clark had requested, 
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he later communicated to Torregrosa and the organizing committee that 
they needed final official recognition from CACS0.61 But just because 
Brundage had obtained confirmation that the State Department would 
issue visas, it did not mean that the Puerto Rican government would ac-
cept it. As stated before, they were willing to confront any move by the 
United States to allow the entry of the Cubans into Puerto Rican terri-
tory. This is exactly what Clark noted in the Merida meeting of December 
7 and 8. At the meeting he could not get assurance from the COPR that 
the Puerto Rican government would accept the visas if granted.62 In fact, 
he was totally opposed to the manner in which Brundage obtained the 
visas. Declaring that Washington was working against IOC regulations, 
he indicated that it was a matter of the Puerto Rican government to affirm 
"its acceptance to the Cuban participation."65 Based on this, Clark gave 
another ultimatum to the Puerto Rican government that included a dead-
line of 1:00 p.m. on December 17, 1965, to "guarantee that the athletes, 
officials, and technicians in general [read Cuba] will be accepted." Said 
certification, he continued, should be addressed to CACSO with copies 
to IOC officials and to IOC members in Latin America. Moreover, if such 
certification failed to be clear and to the satisfaction of CACSO, Puerto 
Rico then forfeited its rights to be the site of the X CACG.64 Once again, 
the ball was back in Puerto Rico's court. 
If all of this was not enough, tensions kept escalating when the Soviets 
got involved in the matter in favor of their Cuban allies. The games were 
getting closer, and on December 31, 1965, Brundage replied to a letter 
sent by Konstantin Andrianov of the Soviet Olympic Committee say-
ing that for the last several months he and General Clark had been "de-
voted to defending the right of your Cuban friends (although many claim 
they are not following Olympic regulations) to participate in the Central 
American Games, which are scheduled for Puerto Rico next year." At the 
end of the letter, Brundage rhetorically wondered, "When are we going to 
be able to concentrate on sport and not be bothered with these unsolvable 
political problems that do not concern us?"65 
Not only were the Soviets paying more attention as the games dreW 
closer, but also locally another group of Puerto Ricans entered the conflict, 
not against the Cuban delegation but in their favor. This group, called the 
Movement for Independence (Movimiento Pro Independencia, or MPI): 
had been founded in 1959 in Mayagiiez under the leadership of Juan Mart 
r 
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Bras and gathered discontented members from the Independent Puerto 
Rican Party (Partido Independemista Puertorriquefio), as well as from the 
Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista). The MPI's members had declared 
themselves to be sympathizers of the Cuban Revolution and, adopting the 
Cubans' methods of popular mobilization under ami-imperialist ideology, 
claimed the independence of Puerto Rico and expressed their solidarity 
with, and active support for, the Cuban delegation in Puerto Rico, vowing 
to protect it.66 An MPI "manifesto" was published in the Cuban newspaper 
Granma on March 24, 1966: "The Cuban athletes will not be alone. There 
will be the Puerto Rican sportsmen and independentistas to stop the provo-
cation plans against Cuba that Yankee imperialism intends to pursue and 
to answer, along with the Cuban athletes if they are forced to do it as well, 
said provocations in the necessary manner. The people of Puerto Rico, cer-
tainly will not permit that those worms and lackeys usurp their represen-
tation or moreover hurt our prestige and national dignity."67 With this in 
mind, Monagas was visibly worried about the involvement of the MPI dur-
ing the games, which according to him had set up an "embassy" in Cuba, 
and he even worried about possible student reinforcements brought from 
the Dominican Republic.68 Moreover, Monagas thought that if Brundage 
were present during the games, hopefully a reign of peace, or at least com-
posure, would be achieved. Yet Brundage declined the invitation because 
he needed to be present at the opening ceremony of a new museum in San 
Francisco that would hold his collection of Oriental art. 69 
lhe Games in San Juan: A Theater of Olympism and Animosity 
With the Cubans' visas approved, it appeared as though the games would 
be held without problems. The Puerto Rican government, although origi-
?ally opposed to receiving the Cuban delegation even if the United States 
Issued the visas, seemed now to follow US mandates and allowed the entry 
of Cuban athletes, thus exhibiting colonial status. This change in attitude 
by the Puerto Ricans was apparently a result of Reickehoff Sampayo's ne-
gotiations with local authorities.70 Thus the threat of a Puerto Rican-US 
conflict was quickly subdued. Because the United States and Cuba had ~ro~en diplomatic relations, the travel plan consisted of Cubans, once 
avlllg their visas, traveling to a third country, such as Mexico or Jamaica, 
and from there taking a commercial plane to San Juan.7 1 
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However, for the Cubans the extra step in travel entailed an "acr of 
aggression" by the United States because they believed they should enter 
Puerto Rico without any impediment. Castro expressed his opinion as 
well that the whole deal was a "stupid, cynical blackmail."72 The Cuban 
press also covered the problems of the visas, stating they only wanrcd 
to have relations directly with the COPR. Nonetheless, they understood 
that this was impossible because Puerto Rico was an estado fibre asociado 
and that "the associated impedes them from being free." 71 In the end, the 
Cubans' visas were later taken from Mexico City, where they were issued, 
to Havana?" 
The Cuban Olympic Committee (COC) had already been notified by 
Brundage of the problems pertaining to its alleged political interference in 
sport. 75 In its defense, COC president Manuel Gonzalez Guerra wrote a 
seven-page letter dated March 30, 1966, indicating that their government 
did not interfere in Olympism and that they respected and strictly fol-
lowed IOC rules.76 He went on to identify that other countries had gotten 
away with the violation of nonreligious or political discrimination in the 
Olympics. For example, the Jamaican Olympic authorities had a Chris-
tian priest bless the 1962 games and "spoke of God, spoke of politics, of 
democracy" in their opening ceremony. Moreover, he wondered why there 
was no action taken against counterrevolutionaries when they "attack" 
the Cubans with propaganda. He believed that there was a real "rhrear 
of attack" in Puerto Rico not only from their "enemies" but also from 
Monagas and even the mayor of San Juan, a claim to which the IOC did 
not seem to give relevance. Yet the most recent form of aggression for him 
was that according to the United States, without IOC objection, Cubans 
needed to go to Mexico or Jamaica to obtain their visas, even though the 
Swiss embassy in Havana usually was in charge of US matters. 7 -
The IOC, in its executive board meeting in Rome in April 1966, gave 
final recognition to the X CACG to be held in Puerto Rico, which for 
them was "an independent state under the protection of the United Stares 
with whom it had a custom union." 7R The unilateral and external approval 
of the Cubans' visas by both the United States and the IOC was silenced 
or unacknowledged in the official minutes. This colonial condition ~f 
Puerto Rico, even at the IOC level, was the price Puerto Ricans paid 1.n 
order to be recognized as a legitimate nation, a member of the OlymptC 
world. 
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For months in 1966 no one knew how the Cuban delegation would 
make its way, if at all, to Puerto Rico. These were moments of immense 
tension due to the unpredictability of the Cuban delegation and the mean-
ings of a communist delegation in US territory at the height of the Cold 
War. Finally, and without the knowledge of the organizing committee 
or any other Puerto Rican authorities, the Cuban merchant vessel Cerro 
Pelado appeared four miles outside San Juan, at the edge of international 
waters, on June 10, 1966, just one day prior to the opening ceremonies. 
Since Puerto Rican ports were-and still are-controlled by the United 
States, and with the Americans not allowing Cuban vessels to enter US 
territory, the Cuban ship positioned at international waters so close to the 
United States meant trouble. This audacious, provocative, and risky move 
by the Cubans placed an immediate alert to all parties involved, including 
COPR and the organizing committee, the Puerto Rican and US govern-
ments, the IOC, and different NOCs from the Soviet bloc. It was another 
crisis at sea, involving East versus West, without nuclear missiles yet fertile 
for conflict. 
Actually the leaders of the Cuban delegation had already contacted 
their Russian allies on June 8, 1966, saying that their "participation ed 
[sic] Puerto Rico under threat as the USA authorities not permitting Cu-
ban team aircraft landing." 79 It also seems that the Cubans had contacted 
their allies in the island, the MPI, and informed them of their decision 
to travel by ship, because on June 10 a boat carrying Juan Mari Bras, 
Norman Pietri, and Angel Silen went to receive the Cerro Pelado in open 
waters.80 Mari Bras, Pietri, and Silen were not directly connected to sport, 
the government or the organizing committee but were known proinde-
pendence Puerto Rican leaders, sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution, 
and vocal about their defiance of US imperialism. In effect, it looked like 
the Cubans were lining up their "chess pieces" just in case they needed 
protection. When local authorities were informed that the Cuban vessel 
Was just outside the international water-border, threatening a political di-
saster, they once more contacted emerging Puerto Rican Olympic leader 
Rieckehoff Sampayo to intervene between the Puerto Rican government 
and the Cuban leaders. 
. Rieckehoff Sampayo, along with other Puerto Rican authorities that 
•nciuded Secretary of State Lastra and Puerto Rican athletic legend Eu-
genio Guerra, boarded the US Coast Guard ship Peacock, under a down-
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pour and great pressure from the public and press, to meet the Cerro 
Pelado. As they approached the Cuban ship, and in a moment of Carib-
bean and Latin American brotherhood, the Cubans cheered the Puerto 
Rican delegation while also playing through the speakers of the ship songs 
of Puerto Rican singer and Latin American sensation Tiro Lara. HI Once 
they reached the Cuban ship-considered Cuban territory-it took the 
Puerto Rican delegation, with passports in hand and on rough Atlan-
tic waters, over an hour to board it. The Puerto Ricans were received by 
Capt. Cornelio Pino Izquierdo, while Rieckehoff Sampayo discussed the 
situation with Minister of Education Jose Llanusa, Gonzalez Guerra, and 
others.R2 
The instructions given to RieckehoffSampayo by Gov. Sanchez Vilella 
were to allow the Cubans to enter the island with their visas but to not 
allow the ship to cross into US waters. After both sides discussed these 
terms for over an hour, Rieckehoff Sampayo, who had graduated from the 
University of Puerto Rico Law School in 1952, proposed an idea to try to 
dissuade them from bringing the ship into San Juan harbor. His theory 
was bold, as he confronted the Cuban Revolution with the exiles in Puer-
to Rico: "This vessel is property of the Cuban government that was seized 
from the property of many Cubans who currently live in Puerto Rico, 
without proper law procedure. If this vessel enters Puerto Rican waters 
and, under the Laws of Admiralty, a Cuban initiates action against the 
Cuban government, this ship gets detained in assurance statement and 
many years will pass in which it will stay in Puerto Rico under arrest."R' 
Reacting to this "theory" by Rieckehoff Sampayo, the Cubans 
stopped negotiations and "scribbled something to the telegraphist." Dur-
ing this recess in the negotiations, the Puerto Ricans were served with cof-
fee and Cuban tobaccos. Meanwhile, it is probable that the Cubans rook 
this opportunity to raise their complaint to their Soviet bloc allies because 
Brundage received emergency telegrams from the leaders of the Hungar-
ian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Soviet Olympic Committees. Andrianov, 
president of the Soviet Olympic Committee, cabled Brundage, "Ask ur-
gent IOC official assistance for Cuban teams enter Puerto Rico."H
11 
The 
Cubans, as during the missile crisis four years before, were fully backed 
by their communist allies. 
Nevertheless, this stressful moment was dissipated when, after sorne 
minutes, the telegraphist returned with a piece of paper for Llanusa. Afrer 
T TI1e Cold War Games of a Colonial Latin American Nation 237 
reading it the Cuban delegation said, "We are ready to get off and leave 
the ship here."H'i It is uncertain what that piece of paper said, and it is 
uncertain what influence Brundage might have played in all of this, but 
at the end of this tense moment of sport diplomacy, the Cubans decided 
to leave the ship in international waters and transport the delegation to 
land by other means. We do have the following statement from the vice 
president of the COC Armando Riva Patterson from that afternoon: "The 
Cuban Olympic Committee considers it a great victory for sports and the 
Olympic movement the entrance of the Cuban delegation in San Juan 
Puerto Rico .... Once again the ever so clear ideas of the renewer of the 
Olympic Games Baron Pierre de Coubertin have triumphed and have put 
in evidence all those who really intend in a permanent manner to mix 
politics with sports .... We expect great success from these games that 
constitute part of the history of the nations located in Central America 
and the Caribe."X(, In this way, while claiming sport victory, the Cuban 
delegation washed its hands of political intervention by announcing its 
peaceful attendance at the games. By doing this, its members thought 
they were protecting Olympism by overcoming political obstacles. None-
theless, they knew that real political tension on the island still persisted, 
warning the Puerto Rican authorities and the members of the IOC that 
"different groups of Cuban exiles resident ... have proclaimed their pur-
pose to attack our delegation."87 
TI1e actual transportation of the delegates began at 5:00 a.m. the next 
day, June 11, the day of the opening ceremonies. Dramatically and under 
great public pressure, several private boats went to the Cerro Pelado to pick 
up the athletes, an ordeal that lasted more than four hours. After going 
through customs and immigration, they were taken by bus to the opening 
ceremony. "The fact that the Cubans were able to land peacefully on the 
island was not the end of the confrontations but just the beginning of the 
conflicts on land. 
The reception of the Cubans in San Juan was full of different reac-
tions. Some reporters indicated that the Cuban athletes were very cordial 
and talkative yet would not speak about politics.xx The only Cuban rep-
resentative who expressed his political dissatisfaction at the games was 
Llanusa, who, as soon as setting foot on one of the local boats on its way 
to port, accused the United States of "inrerfer[ring], obstruct[ing] and 
deiay[ing]" Cuba's participation at the games.wJ Throughout the bus trip 
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to the opening ceremonies at Hiram Bithorn Stadium, the delegation was 
received with crowds alongside the road by two groups: the first showing 
signs of support-led by the MPI-that read "Fatherland or Death, We 
Will Win" and "Greetings Cuban Athletes,"90 and other groups showing 
hostility-led by the Cuban exiles-with signs that read, for example, 
"Russians Go Home." It is interesting to see the clear Cold War political 
alignment of these groups when the MPI used the Cuban revolutionary 
slogan, and the Cuban exiles wrote their sign in English referring to the 
Cubans as Russians. 
Regardless of this political friction, the opening ceremony was real-
ized without any major problems at 3:00 p.m. before a crowd of 19,262 
spectators.91 The official fanfare of the games was composed by Puerto 
Rican music idol Rafael Hernandez. The opening of the games included 
the hoisting of the flags of the CACG, the IOC, and the city of San Juan. 
A chorus of a hundred voices sang the official hymns of the games, includ-
ing the popular song "En Mi Viejo San Juan," to which the crowd also 
sang along.92 The CACG symbolic torch, known as Fuego Azteca, reached 
the stadium after arriving from Mexico on June 1 and was run across the 
island?' 
Despite this air of national and regional confraternity, and despite the 
fact that these games are known today for being peaceful and uneventful, 
there were moments of friction between Cuban athletes, Cuban exiles, 
anti- and pro-Castro Puerto Ricans. One of the most covered incidents, 
the one that produced the most drama, was the only known voluntary 
defection by a Cuban athlete at these games. Juan Pablo Vega Romero, a 
wrestler, defected at midnight on Sunday, June 12, not only because he 
was against Castro's communism94 but because according to him there 
was no racial equality in Cuba.95 Quickly after defecting from the Olym-
pic Village, Vega Romero was taken to the US Immigration Services dis-
trict offices, where he also declared wanting to be taken to the United 
States. Since Puerto Rico is a US territory, there is no legal difference in 
refugee status between the two places in cases of defection. 
There was another incident with a "defector." Initially, it started as 
a rumor when it was reported that an athlete by the nickname "Chiqui" 
was trying to defect and reunite with her exiled parents who lived in 
Puerto Rico.96 The reporter assured that she was being held prisoner and 
isolated in the Olympic Village. However, this version was later rebuked 
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by Llanusa, who declared that the athlete, Maria Cristina Gonzalez, was 
actually "rescued from unknown individuals" in a car who had tried to 
kidnap her.97 She was later taken to the Cerro Pelado "for her safety." 
lhese rumors of defection were constant, as Llanusa dismissed the alleged 
seventeen defections of female athletes who tried to jump off of a Puerto 
Rican bus to ask for asylum.98 
Encouragement to defect can be said to have been a systematic project 
to attack Castro's communist government during the games in San Juan. 
lhere was even a Puerto Rican governmental plan in place-involving 
the local police, the Immigration Service, and the State Department-
before the games started in case of Cuban athlete defectors.99 There was 
a lot of pressure from the Puerto Rican public, the media, and Cuban 
exiles on Cuban athletes to defect. As a matter of fact, the majority of 
the Cuban delegation received some sort of monetary offer to defect and 
make declarations against Castro's regime.100 According to COC presi-
dent Gonzalez Guerra, the radio station WIAC transmitted the show of 
Torres Velazquez, who exhorted Cuban athletes under "provocative and 
offensive" expressions to defect, giving phone numbers to individuals 
who would give food and shelter to up to twenty-five athletes for up to 
thirty days. The initiative was called "Operation Jump to the Side ofFree-
dom."101 Moreover, according to Gonzalez Guerra, the tone of the radio 
program offended Cuban women by calling their men "sons of blank."102 
Yet insults of "communists" were of no offense to them. 
It is difficult to ascertain how many Cuban athletes were tempted to 
defect in San Juan, since there was absolutely no conversation about it 
among them due to fear of the Cuban secret police, which had allegedly 
infiltrated the delegation.10·3 But the pressure to defect was even exerted 
by Puerto Rican police at the Olympic Village, who constantly invited 
the Cubans to "begin their flight to freedom."104 Leaflets, handouts, and 
newspapers were taken to the village inviting the Cuban athletes to defect. 
E~en priests approached some delegates persuading them to leave commu-
ntst Cuba and stay in Puerto Rico, while at some games the loudspeak-
ers announced-apparently false statements-that more Cuban athletes 
kept defecting. As if that was not enough, even during a bus trip from the 
~lyrnpic Village to the Olympic pool there was pressure to defect. The 
us driver made unplanned stops at the sport facilities of the University 
of Pueno Rico and later at a private house on Ponce de Leon Avenue 
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that had a sign reading "Refugio" (Shelter). The bus driver then opened 
the door of the bus and asked the passengers, "Doesn't anybody get off 
here?" 101 
Invitation and pressure to defect were not the only "acts of aggression" 
against the Cuban delegation in Puerto Rico. There were also physically 
violent moments. For example, one member, Luis de Cardenas, was at-
tacked by a "paid agent." When the police came, they actually held De 
Cardenas so that the "paid agent" could keep hitting him. 10c' Moreover, 
during a basketball practice of the Cuban team at a private high school, 
Colegio Espiritu Santo, a group of contrarrevo!ucionarios provoked and 
attacked them, "forcing" the Cubans to fight back. At the end of the 
incident, a local policeman confirmed that the attack was provoked by 
"Cuban exiles."107 Furthermore, the MPI upheld its sworn defense of the 
Cuban athletes when at a soccer match in the Baldrich neighborhood they 
got involved in a shoving match with a group of Cuban exiles. 111H On top 
of that, and more seriously, a car pulled into the Olympic Village, and 
two passengers "threatened" some Cuban delegates, who, reacting to the 
threat, made one of the aggressors drop a pistol. 10~ 
This gun incident was not the only one involving firearms. Jose Lla-
nusa indicated that on two occasions four individuals attempted to mur-
der him. In the first attempt, the individuals were driving an Impala and 
held a rifle; in the second, the same individuals, now driving a Comet, 
possessed handguns. 110 Reacting to these murder attempts, Llanusa de-
nounced them as "exclusively guided by the Central Intelligence Agency 
of the United States." Additionally, he said that the Cuban exiles "were not 
directly responsible," implying that these individuals were more like pup-
pets of the CIA who got paid to do their work. 111 But Llanusa stated rhat it 
was the constant provocations to defect-more than violent attacks--that 
constituted a "psychological war" against the Cuban delegation. 112 
Conclusion 
The violence and hostility at the X CACG of 1966 in San Juan, more than 
reflecting Cold War tensions, was a real measure of East-versus-West com-
petition. Cuba and Puerto Rico embodied Cold War rivalries between the 
Soviet bloc and the United States in the athletic field and in the streets 
of San Juan. Indeed, the incidents outlined above tell the story of ho"' 
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Puerto Rico was the site of another major war-threatening moment in 
twentieth-century Caribbean and Central American history. 
Moreover, a deeper issue for Latin American history is that these 
games proved the colonial condition of Puerto Rico. Puerto Ricans, while 
being the protagonists and hosts of the games, became de facto subalterns 
to the State Department and even the IOC due to the imposed granting 
of the visas to the Cubans. While the Puerto Ricans' intention was to 
prove to their Latin American and Caribbean neighbors that they were 
in fact autonomous enough to host these games, what actually became 
evident was that their alleged political modernization came with a costly 
prize: continued colonialism. The imposition of the visas against the wish-
es of the Puerto Rican authorities demonstrated that in Puerto Rico the 
ultimate control over its governance lay outside the island. 
The MPI was clear about Puerto Rican colonialism, and that is why it 
was so active during these games and overall throughout these years. On 
the other hand, a growing sector of the pro-US-statehood estadista move-
ment also noticed this blatant political subjugation and actively attacked 
the commonwealth. Puerto Rican senator Arturo Ortiz Taro openly de-
clared that "Fidel Castro has ridiculed the Commonwealth government" 
at the X CACG. He went on to specify his point: "The ridicule of the 
Puerto Rican people consists in that making claims of sovereignty, invites 
the Cuban athletes with great fanfare, and when they get to barely 3 miles 
from our beaches, a simple order by a subaltern employee of the Coast 
Guard stops the Cuban vessel outside our shores. This is evidence that 
there is no Puerto Rican sovereignty."113 
This estadista movement was well known for being anti-Castro and 
anticommunist, in addition to anticolonialist. While there are other 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that had similar opposition 
to Castro's regime and that followed the broken diplomatic policies of the 
United States with Cuba, the fact is that Puerto Rico is the only "country" 
to which the United States could do this legally, unilaterally, and without 
questions. Nonetheless, this colonial condition of Puerto Ricans did not 
impede them from participating in the global context during the Cold 
War, characterized as it was by subtle, yet volatile events. 
h Although the story of Central American and Caribbean Olympism 
as not received deserved attention in both historical scholarship and 
Studies of contemporary politics, it is hoped that this chapter sheds light 
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on the real and compelling drama this region has faced. The Tenth Cen-
tral American and Caribbean Games in San Juan were a premier example 
of Latin America and Caribbean Olympism that showed pressing and 
high-stakes diplomacy. Although Avery Brundage had to deal with more 
prominent issues during his roc presidency, his many diplomatic ma-
neuvers at this time show that he did pay enough attention to the Central 
American and Caribbean area. 
Finally, when the games were over, Puerto Rico had finished in the 
third position overall, behind Mexico and Cuba-although they actu-
ally won more total medals than Cuba, they had fewer gold medals. This 
proved without a question that the Puerto Rican nation was still strong, 
competitive, and powerful in Latin American and Caribbean sport. Al-
though this nationhood was colonial and subordinated, it was, never-
theless, real for many. The X CACG legitimized to Puerto Ricans the 
"progress" of Puerto Rican Olympism. All the obstacles to make Puerto 
Rico visible among the nations of the world had been conquered. From 
this moment on, amid persisting colonialism and Cold War conflicts, 
there was no looking back. Puerto Rican Olympism had been officially 
consolidated. 
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